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The distributed nature of command and control requires the consideration of both
processes and communications in the formulation of requirements. Cube Tool is a
methodology used to derive the processing and communication needs for each system
function. An approach is introduced for extending the applicability of Cube Tool to the
determination of requirements for C3I systems. First, using Cube Tool, for each
function, a Petri Net is derived that models all processes and communications for the
correct execution of the function. Then, for a given scenario, these nets are
interconnected and the steps of the methodology are applied again to derive the Petri Net
that represents the mission-dependent requirements for the system.
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INTRODUCTION
The determination of the functional requirements of a system is usually done by
representing the relationships among the different processes which have to take place for the
execution of a mission. When the systems are distributed, the requirements must includenot only
the processes, but also the communications among the different parts of the system. The Cube
Tool has been developed as a methodology for deriving the processing and communication needs
for each system function. In this paper, the methodology is extended to address the determination
of system requirements and their representation in terms of Petri Nets.
Cube Tool (Tournes, 1988) is a methodology developed at THOMSON-CSF in France for
the design and the analysis of C3I systems. The methodology allows for (1) the qualitative and
quantitative design of the architecture of C3I systems; (2) the determination of the characteristics
of the elements, which are known also as the attributes or parameters of the system; and (3) the
definition of the general plan for realization. The Cube Tool covers the application domains
which are common to all C3I systems: communication, information processing, information
storage, supervision/management, and man/machine interface. The application of Cube Tool to
the design and the analysis of a system is done in four steps, as shown in Figure 1.
* Identification of the system Functions and of the different resources (personnel and
hardware/software) involved,
* Functional Analysis for the determination of the processing and information
exchanges for each function,
* Quantitative Evaluation of Automated Data Processing (ADP) and comTlunication
loads in workstations,
* Consideration of different possible architectures through the allocation of the
functions to different sites.
The first step consists of defining the system functions from the missions expected to be
accomplished. Each function is divided in subfunctions. Simultaneously, the resources needed
for the execution of these functions are defined. They consist of personnel and
hardware/software entities such as databases or decision aids and are referred to as Actors. In a
second stage, a functional analysis is performed for each function in a three dimensional space
with axes coresponding to functions, actor and time. In this framework, subfunctions are
defined as a collection of activities with their interrelated information exchanges. Each function
and can be looked on three different planes in the 3-D space: Responsibilities (Actors-Functions),
Actions (Actors-Time) and Sequences (Functions-Time). The main analysis is performed in the
responsibility plane. Activities are differentiated according to the kind of processing they
represent. For each function, the responsibility plane is constructed by allocating the activities to
different actors.
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Figure 1 Methodology Flow Chart
The third step is the quantitative evaluation of Automated Data Processing and
communication loads. To evaluate the processing load, each activity of the functional structure is
defined using a pseudo-code formalism close to PASCAL or ADA. The number of queries to
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databases, the kinds of display and the required computations are included by using a set of
primitives gathered in a dictionary. To evaluate the communication load, the ways information is
displayed and sent are analyzed for the incoming and outgoing data. A processing and
communication load is assigned to each of these primitives. The processing and communication
load quantification for each activity is made by summing the loads of the primitives used to
describe the execution of this activity. Simultaneously, a quantification is made for the maximum
response time to determine the minimum processing power threshold. By summing these
estimates of each logical group (which is the set of activities related to a given system function
and performed by a single actor,) the number and type of workstations, the processing
requirements, the number of database updates and retrievals and the load associated with
processing and related communication flows can be determined.
The last stage is the investigation of different architectures through the allocation of logical
groups to different sites. Generic sites are first defined by gathering logical groups meant to
operate together and sufficient to constitute an independent node. This is done to check data
coherency. Then, the logical groups with their associated loads are assigned onto different sites
according to the areas of responsibilities and interests specific to each logical group and to the
different modes of operation (normal and backups). Within these new system sites, the load is
reallocated to the different workstations according to the type of processing (scientific vs. expert
system) and the security requirements. Different architectures can be obtained and the selection is
made according to criteria such as cost or ease of implementation.
The first two stages, which are essential for the specification of the requirements of a system,
are described in detail in the next section.
FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION AND RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSIS
System Functions andActors Identification
The first stage of Cube Tool consists of identifying the functions of the system to be
designed. At this stage, the designer must find out the user needs, the type of missions the
system will have to accomplish, and the personnel and types of hardware and software which
will be used. This process requires intensive interviews with the user to determine exactly what
the range of operations of the system will be. The missions that the system is expected to carry
out are determined and are used as the basis for the identification of the global tasks that must be
executed for the fulfillment of a mission. These global tasks are the system Functions. For
example, a system for planning an air interdiction mission will have as functions the
determination of the status of allied forces, weather projection, threat assessment, strike
assessment, target prioritization and development, weapon system availability, etc.
4
Then, each system function can be decomposed in subfunctions. The processing tasks are
differentiated from the transmission tasks. A processing task only involves the processing of data
received by an actor in charge of creating or inferring new information. Transmission tasks only
involve the communication of information between two different actors without any alteration in
the content (for example: digital communication, reading of a display, typing, or voice
transmission). A function can be considered to be an interleaved sequence of processing and
communication tasks, a subfunction can be defined as a single pair of a process task and a
communication task. The execution of a function will require the sequential execution of its
subfunctions.
Functional Analysis
The initial specification of system elements, activities, and information exchange is done
through functional analysis in the three dimensions of the Cube Tool, as shown on Figure 2. The
three axes of interest are:
* Functions: These are the processes which have to be executed for the fulfillment of the
mission.
* Actors or Hierarchical Levels: These are the personnel and the hardware and software
nodes responsible for executing the different tasks. Personnel are layered in
hierarchical levels and are most of the time specialized per functional domain
* Time: This axis allows to define on the same time scale the execution time of the
functions, their frequency and their sequence.
Time (When ? How many times ?)
Actors (Who ? Where ?)
Functions (What ?)
Figure 2 Three Dimensional Functional Analysis
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In this analytical framework, a subfunction is composed of activities. An activity is defined
as a process which supports a given system function and which is performed by a single actor or
hierarchical level without major interruption. Therefore, activities can be part of a processing
task, a communication task, or contain elements of both. Activities are differentiated according to
the type of processing they represent and which are called roles. The roles considered by the
method are:
* Elaborate (E): transform or generate information.
* Acknowledge (A): receive an order important enough to warrant the generation of an
acknowledgement.
· Check (C): receive a report in response to an order previously generated.
· Warn (W): receive an information which does not require taking any measures in the
current mode of operation.
* Monitor (M): receive an information on system operation allowing to accomplish
command control and communication resources management.
* Monitor Locally (L): same as M but on a local basis
* Secure (H): exchange of secured data such as encryption keys, access keys and
certification mechanisms of users trustworthiness.
These activities can be looked at from three different perspectives represented by the analysis
planes defined by the three axes, as shown in Figure 3. These are:
* Responsibilities Plane (Functions / Actors): This plane shows which actor is in
charge of a set of specific activities.
* Sequences Plane (Functions / Time): This plane shows when (and how many times)
an activity will be executed.
* Actions Plane (Time / Actors): The plane of actions shows when actors are busy
performing some activity.
The main analysis is performed in the responsibility plane. The roles which are used most
and are the only ones considered for the requirements specification are E, A, C and W. The
responsibility plane is constructed by allocating the roles for each subfunction to the different
actors. This allocation must verify the following rules:
* There is one and only one role E per subfunction.
* Except for the first subfunction which starts the execution of a function, a role E can
only be triggered by a role A or C.
* The presence of a role A requires the presence of a role C in the column of the actor
which has generated the order. More generally the exchange which take place from a
higher hierarchical level to a lower one is done by the presence of roles A, W.
Exchanges which take place from a lower hierarchical level to a higher one are done
by the presence of role C. The pairs E-A, E-W and E-C correspond to exchange of
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information from the actor performing the role E to the actor performing the other role
(A, W or C).
Time ( When ? How many times ? )
S
e q | Actions
C / Actors (Who ? Where ? )
Responsibilities
Functions (What ? )
Figure 3 The three Analysis planes
This is illustrated in the example shown on Table 1.
Table 1: Responsibilities for a Function with six subfunctions performed by four actors
actor actor actor actor 4
subfunction 1 E A W _
subfunction 2 C E A W
subfunction 3 C E A
subfunction 4___ C E
subfunction 5 C E
sutlunctton o t e e ti
Explicit exchanges take place across columns, between activities contributing to the execution
of the same subfunction (i.e., on same row). Implicit exchanges occur from row to row between
activities performed by a single actor. The interesting aspect of this methodology is that several
configurations, differing as to the resources used or reflecting variations in operational needs,
can be represented in a consistent manner. This allows to define different thresholds of
responsibilities in different modes (normal mode or emergency modes) and to point out how the
reallocation of the tasks has to be made among the available actors when the system switches
from one mode to another.
The next section shows how to convert the allocation of roles into Petri Nets and how the
detailed requirements of a system for a particular mission can be generated.
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PETRI NET REPRESENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS
The requirements of a system are the set of processes which have to take place for the correct
execution of a mission. These requirements are scenario-dependent and are most often defined by
the set of functions with their sequences and interrelationships. In Valraud (1989), the
requirements are described by a Petri Net in which system functions are represented with
transitions and the data produced by these functions, necessary for the execution of subsequent
functions, with places. These nodes are connected together to model the relationships among.,
functions and to show what should be their order of execution. This section describes how to
develop more detailed requirements of a system which take into account not only the different
processes which have to take place, but also the communication exchanges between the different
parts of the system.
The Cube Tool can be used to define, for each function, the processes and the
communication exchanges among the different actors involved in the execution of that function.
The Petri Nets depict graphically these processes and communication exchanges for each
function. When these representations are linked together to construct the requirements, a global
and consistent graphical representation can be defined that lets the designer or the analyst take
advantage of the mathematical framework which underlies Petri Nets.
Representing the Responsibilities for a Function with Petri Nets
As we have seen in the previous section, the first two steps of Cube Tool result in the
definition of the different system functions, their subfunctions, and how the activities
constituting these subfunctions are allocated to the different actors of the system. For each
system function, the responsibility analysis plane defines the activities performed by the different
actors. From this representation, the generation of the equivalent Petri Nets representation of the
responsibilities for each function is done in three steps.
In the first step, each activity is depicted by a transition. The transitions representing the
activities performed by the same actor are aligned horizontally, while the ones representing the
activities belonging to the same subfunction are aligned vertically. In other words, the transpose
of the array of responsibilities is obtained and the non-null elements of this array are transformed
into transitions, as shown in the Figure 4.
A label is attached to each transition identifying (1) the function, (2) the subfunction to which
the represented activity belongs, (3) the type of activity (E, A, C or W) and (4) the actor
performing this activity. For example, in Figure 4, the label 1.3E3 means that the activity
represented by the transition belongs to subfunction 3 of function 1, is of type E, and is
performed by actor 3. In the application described in this paper, the subfunctions are identified
by the identification number of the processing they represent throughout the system.
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Figure 4 Drawing the transitions grid
The second step is to add places between the transitions representing the activities performed
by a single actor and to connect them. In this way, the implicit information exchanges which take
place between the successive activities performed by each actor are modeled. Figure 5 shows the
net obtained for the example.
1.1E1 1.2C1 1.6C1
1.1A2 1.2E2 1.3C2 1.5C2 1.6E2
1.1 W3 1.2A3 1.3E3 1.4C3 1.5E3 1.6W3
1.2W4 1.3A4 1.4E4
Figure 5 Adding Implicit Information Exchanges
The third step consists of adding the information exchanges which take place among the
actors for each subfunction. Let us recall that in the Cube Tool methodology, an exchange
originates from a role E and ends at a role A, W or C and that there is one and only one role E for
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each subfunction. Therefore, for each column of the Petri Net representation obtained after the
two first steps, the transition representing the role E is identified and is connected to the other
transitions of the columns with a connector-place-connector set. Figure 6 shows the net obtained
by adding these explicit information exchanges.
1.1 E1 1.2C1 1.6C1
/1.1A2 a,1.2E2 1.3C2 1.5C2t 7 1.6E2
1A.W3Q 1.2A3 1.3E3 1.403 1.5E3 l.6W3
tJ W41A 1.3A4 1.4E4
Figure 6 Add Explicit Information Exchanges
Modeling the requirementsfor a scenario
The procedures for modeling the detailed requirements for a given scenario is shown on
Figure 7.
The definition of a scenario, that is a mission to be carried out, leads to the specification of
the relationships and sequences of system functions. For the fulfillment of a mission, one can
identify the system functions which can be executed concurrently as well as the functions which
will have to be executed first to trigger the execution of a sequence of functions. These
interrelationships among functionsvary from one scenario to another. Petri Nets are used to
represent the sequencing and concurrency of functions so that the global requirements of a
system can be derived. The procedure for determining the detailed requirements starts with the
definition of the responsibilities for the chosen scenario. To list the functions on the Functions
axis, the slices (Hillion,1986) of the Petri Nets representing the global requirements are
computed. These slices represent the functions which can be executed concurrently. The
functions are listed on this axis in the order of appearance in the slices list. Then, for each
function, the actor which triggers the execution and gets the final report is identified. This actor is
designated as the main one responsible for the execution of this functions. Once the main actors
are listed on the Actors axis, the responsibility plane for the scenario can be constructed. For
each function:
· A role E is placed on the cell defined by the function and by the main actor.
· Roles W are placed on the cells defined by the functions and by the main actors who
are responsible for the execution of the subsequent functions as determined by the
Petri Nets of the global requirements.
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Figure 7 Procedures to Model the Detailed Requirements of a System
Let us consider an example where there are three functions: fl, f2 and f3, and three actors
(Al, A2 and A3). The scenario specification has determined that fl and f2 have to be executed
before f3. The Petri Net is shown on Figure 8 and the slices are:
Slice 1: fl, f2
Slice 2: f3
Figure 8 An example of Global Requirements represented with Petri Nets
The responsibilities specification of each function show that Al is the main actor for fl, A2
for f2, and A3 for f3. The scenario responsibility plane is constructed by placing a role E in the
cells (fl, Al), (f2, A2) and,(f3,A3) and a role W in the cells (fl, A3) and (f2, A3), as shown on
Table 2.
Table 2 Example of Scenario Requirements
fl E W
From the information in the scenario responsibilities plane, the equivalent Petri Net can be
constructed following the same procedure that was used for the functions. The next step is to
replace each transition representing a function with the equivalent representation of the
responsibilities of this functions. By adding the implicit exchanges among actions for each actor,
the Petri Net of the detailed requirements is constructed.
In the next section, an application of the methodology to a system for planning air interdiction
missions is presented.
A PLANNING SYSTEM FOR AIR INTERDICTION MISSION
The system used to illustrate the methodology is a fictitious one called MESACC, which
stands for Modular, Endurable, Survivable, Austere, Command Center and which has been
studied by Valraud (1989).
The objective of an air interdiction mission system is to plan operations against the enemy's
military potential before it can be effectively used against friendly forces. These operations
restrict the combat capability of the enemy by:
· delaying, disrupting, or destroying his lines of communications
· destroying enemy supplies
· attacking fixed, moving and movable point and area targets
· destroying unengaged or uncommitted enemy attack formations before they can be
brought into the battle.
The result of these operations is to disrupt enemy plans and time schedules. The integration
of air interdiction operations with the fire and maneuver plans of surface forces is not required.
However, these offensive air operations are planned and conducted as part of the unified effort of
all friendly forces. Therefore, air interdiction demands precise coordination in timing.
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Function Identification
The identification of the functions of the system requires. the examination of the context and
the environment in which the system operates. The context consists of the geographical
characteristics of the battle area. It is assumed that the system is operating in Europe, and more
specifically in the central region (CENTAG). The environment consists of the friendly forces,
their assets, strength, current plans and orders, the enemy forces, their assets, strength, current
plans and orders. Also, the current weather is part of the environment as it is a particularly
important factor in air interdiction mission planning. The functions needed to plan an Air
Interdiction Mission are listed in Table 3.
Table 3 System Functions of MESACC
Function # - Descnption
1 Weather Projection
Status of Allled forces
4 Strike Assesment
.5 1. Threat Asesment
O Cfiurrent lligence
7 Target Development/Prioritization .....
b Aimpoint Conslruction/weaponeerng
11 Weneapon Ss/Atte Availabi
Let us describe briefly each of these functions:
* weather projection: This function forecasts the weather from the current weather
reports.
* format messages / information fusion / update databases This function transforms the
format of the various data inputs into a common format. The function performs also
decoding. Then, this function updates the current information as new messages come
in the system. For example, if the database contains the position of a particular enemy
battalion, and later an intelligence report confirms that the battalion has moved to
another position, then the function is used to update the position of that battalion, its
strength, and current plans.
* status of allied forces: This function is used to assess the current state of the allied
forces, number of troops, equipment, and of available aircraft for missions.
* strike assessment: This function updates the situation on the battlefield, as a result of
previous air interdiction missions.
* threat assessment: This function evaluates the threat of the enemy forces in the
different subareas of the battlefield.
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* intelligence report: under certain circumstances, reports from intelligence may
be requested when the uncertainty about some parameters of the problem is deemed
too high.
· target prioritization/target development: This function is needed to prioritize the most
important objective to be destroyed, given the situation. The resources that can be
used for the next mission may be scarce so that it may not be possible to allocate
assets to all objectives.
* aimpoint construction/weaponeering: This function provides the coordinates of the
target, and allocates certain classes of friendly assets according to the objective and its
intrinsic characteristics.
* penetrationlattrition analysis: This function forecasts the degree of redundancy that is
adequate for each objective. Different platforms may be assigned the same objectiveto
protect friendly assets. Therefore, redundancy insures a greater degree of certainty
over the outcome of the mission.
* mission planning: this function delivers the final output of the system to the
environment. It consists of a set of missions with the objectives, the type of aircraft to
be used, its armament, the number of aircraft to be used for each objective, the route
to be followed, and the time to perform the mission.
* weapon system availability: This function describes what weapons are available for
the mission at the time it is planned. This function tells what is available according to
the weather forecasts (some aircraft cannot fly under certain circumstances), and the
status of the allied forces (losses, use of reserves).
For the identification of the actors, Valraud (1989) considers eleven workstations, located in
two shelters, and seven databases. In addition, the intelligence center is considered as an actor
providing the latest information about the situation. In this example, databases are considered to
be actors because they are distributed and exchanges have to take place on the network to access
them. These seven databases are:
· DB-wt: contains weather forecasts produced by fl.
· DB-wp: contains data about weapons availability, given the status of the allied
equipment, and the weather forecasts.
· DB-en: contains data about the enemy.
· DB-ba: contains data about the situation on the battle field.
* DB-st: contains data about strike assessment, i.e., the result of f4.
* DB-th: contains data about threat assessment, i.e., the results of f5.
· DB-al: contains data about the allied forces.
There are, therefore, a total of nineteen actors as listed in Table 4.
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Table 4 The Nineteen Actors of MESACC
ctor -Desc rtion Notation
1 ston 1
~ Worsaion. . .......Workstation 7
orkstation ....
Workstation 9
1 T Workstation W
f.... iY06i'i 1i :11
' Datl Baif e e ther - DB-ewt
1W Data Base Weapons S-
1W Data Base Enemy Forces-en
17 Data Base Sike Assesment DB-st
7 ta Base r DB-th
Data BaseMAlld Forces
For each function, subfunctions have been defined. Some of them are used in different
functions and, for clarity, a unique identification number has been assigned to each one, which is
used consistently in the figures and tables. The list is given in Table 5.
Table 5 Subfunctions used in MESACC
Subfunction # Descripubfunction on
1 Acknowledge 27 Request Strike Assessment Data
Requst Weather ata 28 G ie Asessent Data
3 Get Weather Data 29 Assess Strike
4 Deduce Weather Proiection 30 Update Strike Assessment DataBase
5 Update Weather Data Base 31 Request Strike Report
6 Request WeatherProjection 32 Generate Strike Re
7 Get Weather Proiection 33 Request Threat Assessment Data
8 Request Allied Data 34 Get Threat Assessment Data
9 Get Allied Forces Data 35 Update Threat Assessment DataBase
10 Fuse Allied Forces Information 36 Modify Threat Assessment
11 ate Allied Forces DataBase 37 Rank Threats
12 Determine Allied Status 38 Request Tagets List
13 Request Allied Report 39 Get Targets list
14 Get Allied Report 40 Request Available Weaons
15 Request Enemy Forces Data 41 Get Available weapons
16 Get Enemy Forces Data 42 Request Weapon Data
17 Fuse Enem Forces Information 43 Get Weapon Data
18 Update Enemy Forces DataBase 44 Generate new Weapon status
19 Re quoes t 45 Generate List of Available Weapons
20 Generate Enemy Report 46 Reauest Current Intelligence
21 Request Battlefield Data 47 Get Current Intelligence
22 Get Battlefield Data 48 Aimpoint Construction Weaponeering
23 Fuse Battlefield Information 49 Perform Analysis
24 Update Battlefield DataBase 50 Request Penetration Analysis
25 Request Battlefield Report 51 Get Penetration An alysis
26 Generate Battlefield Report 52 Plan Mission
15
Responsibility Specifications for each Function
The allocation of roles is illustrated for function f3, Status of Allied Forces. To determine the
status of allied forces, Workstation WS7 needs to get information from the battlefield and to
deduce from the last state of the allied forces the new status. Therefore, WS 8 is queried to obtain
a battlefield report (subfunction "Request Battlefield Report"). To do this, WS8 has to access the
database Battlefield (subfunctions "Request Battlefield Data" and "Get Battlefield Data") to make
the report that it sends to WS7 (subfunction "Generate Battlefield Report"). According to the data
that WS7 has just received, WS7 accesses the allied forces data base (subfunction "Request
Allied Data" and "Get Allied Data") to determine the new status of the allied forces (subfunction
"Determine Allied Status"). Once this is performed, the allied forces database has to be updated
(subfunctions "Update Allied Forces" and "Acknowledge"). The responsibility analysis plane is
shown on Table 6.
Table 6 Responsibilities for Function f3
f3 Status of AlliedForces Actor# 7 8 16 19
-U uunctio Actor WS7 WS8 DB-ba DB-al
2 Rquest Battlefield Report E A
21 Request Battlefield Data E A
2 Get Battlefield Data C E
Generate Battlefield Report C E
Reuest Allied Data E A
.Get Allied Forces Data C E
1 Determ.ine Allied Status E
1 Update Allied Forces DataBase E A
Acknowl Ed. e
Figure 9 displays the Petri Net deduced from this responsibility analysis plane.
3.25E7 3.26C7 3.8E7 3.9C7 3.12E7 3.11E7 3.1C7
Figure 9 Petri Net for Function f3
By performing the same analysis for the other functions, the responsibilities planes
described on Tables 7 to 15 and the Petri Nets displayed on Figures 10 to 19 are obtained.
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Function 1: Weather Projection
Table 7 Responsibilities for Function fl
fl Weather Projection Actor# 1 13
ubt Subunction Actor Wsl Db-wt
Request Weather Data E A
Get Weather Data C E
Deduce Weather Projection E
U ate Weather Data Base E A
lAckn owl C .. E
1.2E1 1.3C1 1.4E1 1.5E1 1.1 C1
1.2A13. 1.3E13 1 .5A13 1.1E13
Figure 10 Petri Net for Function fl
Function 2: Format Messages/Fusion of InformationlUpdate Database
Table 8 Responsibilities for Function f2
f2 Form. Mess. ate.DB Actor# 7 15 8 16 11 19
Subf# Subfunction Actor WS7 DB-en WS8 DB-b WS11 DB-al
ReqestAllied Data E A
9 Get Allied Forces Data C E
01 Fuse Allied Forces Information E
11,:pdate Allied Forces DataBase E A
1 Acknowledge C E
15 Request Enemy Forces Data E A
16 Get Enem ForcesData C E
1 Fuse Enemy Forces Information E
Forces DataBase E A
1 Acknowledge C E
21 R uest Battlefield Data E A
22 Get Battlefield Data C E
23 Fuse Battlefield Information E
24 Update Battlefield DataBase E A
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2.15E7 2.16C7 2.17E7 2.18E7 2.1C7
.115 AE15
2.21 E8 2.22C8 2.23E8 2.24E8 2.1C8
~2.21A1 2.24J 2.E1 6
2.8E11 2.9G1 2.1 OE1 2.11E11 2.1C11
(A19 ~ 2.9E'19 Al E19
Figure 11 Petri Net for Function f2
Function 4: Strike Assessment
Table 9 Responsibilities for Function f4
f4 Strike Assesment Actor# 7 15 8 . 17 18
R rU uncton ...... Actor WS7 DB-en WS8 DB-st DB-
27 Request Strike Assessment Data E A
28 Get Strike Assessment Data C E
19 Request Enemy Report A E
15 Reuest Enem Forces Data E A
16 Get E Forces Data C E
2 Generate Enemy Report E C
33 Request Threat Assessment Data E A
34 Get Threat Assessment Data C E
29 Assess Strike E
3 Update Strike Assessment DataBase E A
1 Acknow e C E
4.19A7 4.15E7 4.16C7 4.20E7
4 1 4.2186E15
4.27E8 4.28C8 19E8 O4.20C8 4.33E8 4.34C8 4.29E8 4.30E8 4.1C8
4.27 4.28E17 7 + 1 E
4.33A1 .34E18
Figure 12 Petri Net for Function f4
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Function 5: Threat Assessment
Table 10 Responsibilities for Function f5
f5 . Threat Assesment Art 7 15 8 16 9 18
Subf# Subfunction Actor WS7 DB-en WS8 DB-ba A9 DB-th
33 Request Threat Assessment ata W W E A
34 Get Threat Assessment Data C E
19 Request Enemy Report A E
1 R uest Enemy Forces Data E A C
16 Get Enemy Forces Data C E
20 Generate Enemy Reprt E C
Request Battlefield Repor E A
21 Request Battlefield Data E A
22Get Battlefield Data C 
26 Generate Battlefield.Repor .. E C
35 UpdateThreat Assessment DataBase E A
1 Ackno ge- - --
5.19A7 5.15E7 5.16C7 5.20E7
5.16E15
5.25A8 5.21 E8 5.22C8 5.26E8
5.33E9 5.34C9 E199_ 5.15C9 Q 5.20C9 \.25 9 (£5.26C9 5.35E9 5.1C9
E1igure 13 Petri Net for Function f5E18
Figure 13 Petri Net for Function fS
Function 6: CurrentIntelligence
Table 11 Responsibilities for Function f6
f6 Current Intelli ence tor# 9 12
Subf# Subfunction Actor WS9 INC
46 Reqs Currens t Intelligence E A
47 Get Current Intelligence C E
- 3 Modi Threat Assessment E
6.46E9 6.47C9 6.36E9
6.46A7E12
Figure 14 Petri Net for Function f6
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Function 7: Target Prioritization/TargetDevelopment
Table 12 Responsibilities for Function f7
f7 Target Develop./Priorit. LActor# 2 6 16 18
Subf# Subfunction Actor WS2 WS6 DB-ba DB-th
33 Request Threat Assessment Data E A
34 Get Threat Assessment Data C E
25 Request Battlefield Report E A
21 Reuest Battlefield Data C E A
22 GetBattlefieldData C E
24 Generate Battlefield R C E2.6 _  . . .......... -
37 Rank Threats E
7.33E2 7.34C2 7.25E2 7.21 C2 7.26C2 7.37E2
7.25A 7.21 E6 7.22C 6t7.26E6
7.21 2E16
7.33A18 .34E18
Figure 15 Petri Net for Function f7
Function 8: Aimpoint Constructionl Weaponeering
Table 13 Responsibilities for Function f8
f8 _Aimpoint Construct./Wea n Actor# 4
Sububfunction .Actor WS4
.. Aonrint Construction WeaEone E
8.48E4
Figure 16 Petri Net for Function f8
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Function 9: Penetration/Attrition Analysis
Table 14 Responsibilities for Function f9
f9. Penetration/Attrition Anal. Antor#t 3 6 15 17 10 19
Subf# Subfunction WS3 Ws6 DB-en DB-st WS1O DB-al
1 R R t R E A
15 Request Enemy Forces Data A E
1 Get Forces Data E C
2CGenerate EemR t C E
3 Reuest Strike Reort E A
27 R ust Strike Assessment Data C A
28 Get Strike Assessment Data C E
32 Generate Strike rt C E
8 Request Allied Data E A
9 Get Allied Forces Data C E
4 Perform Analysis E 
9.19E3 9.200C3 9.31E3 9.27C3 9.32C3 9.8E3 9.9C3 9.49E3
| > 3~6X 9.27E6 E6
9.15A15 9.16E15
\.27A8 E .28E17
9.1 9A0 0 16010 20 E10
9.8A19 9E19
Figure 17 Petri Net for Function f9
Function 10: Mission Planning
Table 15 Responsibilities for Function f10
fl0 MissionPlannin - A tr# 1 2 3 4 5
_[u..bf l Actor WS1 WS2 WS3 WS4 WS5
38 Requ Targets List A E
39 Get Targets list E C
4 eA able W ons E A
41 Get Available weC E
6 Request Weather Projection A E
7 Get Weather Proiection E C
5 Request Penetration Analsis A E






0.3 0.39C4 t0.4E4 0.4C4 .61 10.7 10.50 10.51C4 10.52E4
10.40O 10.41E5
Figure 18 Petri Net for Function f10
Function ]1: Weapon System Availability
Table 16 Responsibilities for Function fl 1
fll Weapon System Avail 13 5 14 10 19
Subf# Subfunction At DB WS5 DB WS10 DB-al
42 Request Weapon Data E A......
43 Get Weapon Data C E
13 Request Allied Reort E A
8 Request Allied Data C E A
9 Get Allied Forces Data C E
14 Get Allied Report C E
44 Generate new Weaon status E A
1 Acknowledge C E
2 Request Weather Data A E
3 Get Weather Data E C
45 Generate List of AvailableWapons ......E
11.2A13 11.3E13
11.42E5 11.43C5 11.13E5 11.8C5 11.14C5 1144E5 11.31C 11 4A5E5
I.tt.t3AtO1- E11.2 19C 1.4E10
'114.81Et 14. 9E 19
Figure 19 Petri Net for Function fl 1
The Global Functional Requirements
I A specific scenario is considered next. It is assumed that the hostilities started two days ago.
Although the enemy has gained ground on the battlefield, the friendly forces resist the pressure,
and major assets in reserve have not been committed on either side. The conflict is a conventional
one. The friendly forces and the enemy forces have both fairly accurate information about the
situation on the other side. Each side knows what the resources are on the opposing side, as well
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as the location of these assets, although some uncertainty remains. In certain areas, the battle line
is difficult to assess. Therefore, there is a need to use MESACC to plan long distance, high
altitude interdiction missions. Since the conflict started two days ago, the database already exists.
All the other functions described earlier are in use.
The various data inputs from the sensors are weather reports, reports on friendly and enemy
forces (strength, position, status), combat reports, request from the local Command Center for
assistance, mission reports, and current and future operations plans. The output is unique and






f4 I- f7 D- f8
f4 - ) f9
f5 - I f4
It should be understood that this description of the interrelationship between functions is
purely functional. If a function is derived from another, it does not mean that the input of that
function is sufficient. Indeed, data from the context may be necessary (terrain information for
example). The global functional requirements of MESACC are described by the Petri Net of
Figure 20. This Petri Net contains only one switch, sl, which represents the optional use of the
"Current Intelligence" function, f6.
~~~fi ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
f2 / f9
f5 s1 f4 f7 f8
Figure 20 MESACC: The Global Functional Requirements
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Detailed Requirements
The Petri Net obtained from the global functional requirements is used to determine the
slices of the Net. The slices are:
Slice 1: fl, f2. Slice 5: f7, f9.
Slice 2: f3, f5. Slice 6: f8.
Slice 3: f6. Slice 7: flO.
Slice 4: f4,fl 1.
To determine how data are transmitted among functions, Cube Tool has to be applied once
more. The purpose is to define the global responsibility for the scenario. In the definition of the
responsibilities for each function, only one actor triggers the execution and gets the final report.
By looking at the global functional requirements, and at the different responsibility planes, one
can identify where the output of each function has to be sent in order to generate the Scenario
Responsibilities Plane shown on Table 17. The derived Petri Net is shown on Figure 21.
Table 17 Scenario Responsibilities
_ WW .:-r_.ZZ -- - -------- --





The representation of the detailed requirements is obtained (1) by replacing each transition
containing the letter E with the Petri Net representation of the responsibilities of the functions this
role E models and (2) by adding the implicit information exchanges between the functions
performed by a single actor. Figure 22 displays the detailed requirements of MESACC.
CONCLUSION
Cube Tool has been extended from functions to systems. A methodology for deriving
structural requirements has been proposed. It is used to represent with the Petri Net formalism
the processes and communications which take place for the correct execution of a mission. This
methodology fills a gap between the description of requirements and the quantitative models
needed for the analysis and evaluation of C3I systems designs.
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Figure 22 The Detailed Requirements Of MESACC
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